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POLITICAL ASYLUM UNDER THE 1980
REFUGEE ACT: AN UNFULFILLED
PROMISE
Arthur C. Helton*

1
Three years after the
,, passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, its mandate that uniform and neutral standards be· utilized in the asylum adjudication process remains unfulfilled. Rather, the Act's mandate is
subservient to foreign and domestic policy considerations which continue to dominate asylum decision making. Indeed, the standards and
practices used in the asylum process, including alien interdiction and
detention programs, have served to jeopardize the very right of asylum.
Unless Congress and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
act to implement the Refugee Act of 1980, the right of asylum will
remain mired in domestic and international politics. Part I of this Article
reviews the history and development of asylum law in the United States
which culminated in the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. It analyzes
the failure of the responsible administrative authorities to follow the
dictates of the law - a circumstance which prompted the passage of
the Act and which now threatens to subvert the right to asylum in
the United States. Part II considers the impact on asylum seekers of
new ali_en interdiction and detention programs, and the legality of those
programs under domestic and international law. Finally, Part III makes
specific recommendations, including proposals for changes in the administration of asylum law in the United States, with a view toward
depoliticizing the process and ensuring prompt and fair adjudications.

I.

ASYLUM

LAW

PRIOR TO

1968

The United States has traditionally had one of the most generous
and compassionate refugee programs. Nonetheless, the history of asylum
and refugee· law in this country prior to 1969 is essentially a saga of
reaction to crises as they arose 2 and of ideological and geographical

* Director, Political Asylum Project, Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights,
New York, New York. B.A., 1971, Columbia University; J.D., 1976, New York University.
I. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
2.· See, e.g., The Displaced Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948). This
legislation was enacted to address mass migration in the wake of World War II.
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biases. 3 Before 1968, there were three procedures, each with different
standards, under which aliens could seek refuge in the United States.

A.

Withholding of Deportation

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 4 the Attorney
General was authorized to ''withhold deportation of any alien . . .
to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to
physical persecution." s Under this discretionary authority to decline
to deport an alien from the United States, the Board of Immigration
Appeals of the Department of Justice 6 developed strict limiting principles. The "favorable exercise of discretion" was limited to "cases
'of clear probability of persecution of the particular individual
petitioner'. " 1 The "clear probability" standard, furthermore, was
stringently applied. 8
•
The application of this limiting principle was reviewable by courts
only for administrative abuse of discretion. The standard of review
was quite deferential. Even where "[t]he Attorney General's course of
conduct ... shows consistency in the various cases," his ungenerous
3. See, e.g., The Displaced Persons Act, Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat.
219 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 581, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1949) (acknowledging the use of the
law to accept political dissidents from communist countries); see also Anker & Posner, The Forty
Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981).
4. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982))
[hereinafter cited as 1952 Act].
5. 1952 Act § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
Prior to 1965, an alien had to establish that he or she would be subject to "physical persecution"
to be eligible for withholding. In 1965, "physical persecution" was replaced by "persecution
on account of race, religion, or political opinion." Immigration and Nationality Act, 1965 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § II, 79 Stat. 911,918 (1965) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Amendments]. This change was considered by Congress to be
in harmony with the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, even
though the United States had not formally acceded to the Convention. See In re Tan, 12 I.
& N. Dec. 564 (BIA 1967).
6. The Board is defined by statute. It is a creature of regulation and a delegate of the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(a) (1983). lfhe decisions of the Board cited in this Article, unless
otherwise indicated, have been designated as "precedents." 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(g) (1983).
7. In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 72 (BIA 1968) (citation omitted); see also Lena v. INS,
379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967); In re Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568 (BIA 1967).
8. See, e.g., In re Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (BIA 1967) (voluminous documentation of abuse
of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, letters from relatives, and an attack on the family business ruled
insufficient); In re Kojoory, 12 I. & N. Dec. 215, 217 (BIA 1967) (Iranian president of student
anti-Shah organization denied withholding despite findings of "no doubt" that alien was "prominently involved" in political activities in the United States, and that it was "likely" that he
had been so identified by the government of Iran); See also Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,
503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). In Haitian Refugee
Center, the district court found evidence of systematic and serious persecution by the Haitian
government throughout the cases reviewed, yet not one applicant had met the "clear probability"
standard. For example, one woman's father had been killed by Ton Ton Macoutes, who had
come to arrest her just after she had fled. Another woman had been jailed after the murder
of her husband and her son. 503 F. Supp. at 474-510.
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interpretation of the law in· a particular case was deemed insufficient
cause to hold that he had abused his discretion. 9
B.

Conditional Entry Status

The second procedure, conditional entry, was enacted in 1965 10 and
principally concerned the admission of refugees from overseas. The
INS could grant this status to aliens who could demonstrate that they
had fled a communist or Middle Eastern country because of persecution based on race, religion, or political opinion. 11 There was a numerical
ceiling on admissions, and relief was strictly limited by ideology and
geographic location. 12
Judicial review was ordinarily precluded, since most of the eligibility
determinations were made abroad and few eligible aliens had been able
to come to the United States. Although the precedents are rare, 13 it
is apparent that the conditional entry standard was more lenient than
the withholding standard. 14
C.

Parole Power of the Attorney General

In 1952, the Attorney General was granted authority to "parole"
aliens temporarily into the country "for emergent reasons or for reasons
deemed strictly in the public interest." 15 This procedure was also used
to admit refugees from overseas. In contrast to conditional entry, there
were no numerical limitations. In contrast to withholding, there were
9. Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967).
10. 1965 Amendments § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (1965) (repealed at 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980)).
11. Id. Section 3 allowed the INS to grant conditional entry status to aliens who could
demonstrate that
(i) because of persecution ... on account of race, religion, or political opinion they
have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II)
from any country within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or
unwilling to return to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political
opinion, and (iii) are not nationals of the countries or areas in which their application
for conditional entry is made . . . .
12. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(a) (1983), which limits the countries in which conditional entry
visas could be processed to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, and
Lebanon.
13. The only reported cases prior to 1968 are In re Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec. 201 (BIA
1967) (Polish visitor); In re Lalian, 12 I. & N. bee. 124 (BIA 1967) (Iranian visitor); and In
re Frisch, 12 I. & N. Dec. 40 (BIA 1967) (Yugoslavian student).
14. See Cheng Fu Sheng v. Barbar, 269 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1959) (construing the term
"fear of persecution" in the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 as "in sharp contrast" to the stringent
withholding of deportation provision); see also In re Ugricic, 14 I. & N. Dec. 384, 385-86 (BIA
1972) (finding conditional entry to require but "good reason to fear persecution"); In re Adamska,
12 I. & N. Dec. 201, 202 (BIA 1967) (holding conditional entry to be "substantially broader"
than the pre-1965 withholding).
15. 1952 Act§ 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(1982)).
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no ideological or geographic limitations. In practice, however, as the
following table shows, the parole power was used almost exclusively
to bring in those fleeing communism.
PRE-1968 USE OF PAROLE POWER 16
Non-Communist
Europe (1956)
Communist
Hungary (1957)
Cuba (1960-67)
Chinese-Hong Kong (1962)
USSR (1963)

D.

Total Authorized
-925

32,000
185,487
15,000
224
232,711

The Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees

In 1968, the United States became a party to.the 1967 United Nations
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol). 11 The United
States thereby bound itself to apply the provisions of the Protocol, 18
which defines a "refugee" as a person who has a "well-founded fear
of being persecuted" based on "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion." 19
The sponsors of the Protocol, and expert witnesses who appeared
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, guaranteed unequivocally that ratification "would not impinge adversely upon the Federal and
16. Compiled from Schmidt, Development of United States Refugee Policy, INS REPORTER,
Fall 1979, at 1-3; World Refugee Crisis: The International Community's Response, Report to
the Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1979) [hereinafter cited as World
Refugee Crisis].
17. The Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees was opened for signature on January
31, 1967. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
It was ratified by the United States on October 4, 1968. 114 CoNG. REc. 29,607 (1968). The
Protocol expressly incorporates the terms of the Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
18. S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1968); Letter of Submittal, Message from
the President of the United States transmitting the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
S. EXEC. Doc. No. K., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. v (1968); see In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310,
313 (BIA 1973).
19. Protocol, supra note 17, at art. I, § 2; Convention, supra note 17, at art. 1, § A(2).
According to the Protocol, a "refugee" is a person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
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State laws of this country." 20 In particular, Eleanor McDowell of the
State Department's Office of the Legal Advisor stated in her testimony
before the Committee that ''existing regulations which have to do with
deportation would permit the Attorney General sufficient flexibility
to enforce the provisions of this convention which are not presently
contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act." 21
This flexibility proved to be limited; the Protocol was not followed
in practice. Rather, immigration authorities continued to adhere to traditional, restrictive standards, as a review of post-Protocol asylum practice demonstrates.
1. Post-Protocol withholding of deportation- The withholding of
deportation provision, as amended in 1965, authorized the Attorney
General "to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States
to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to
persecution on account of his race, religion or political opinion and
for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason." 22
The considerable flexibility permitted under the withholding provision
could have accommodated the new refugee standard. However, although
the Board of Immigration Appeals limited negative exercises of
discretion, 23 it retained the "clear probability" standard. 24
Furthermore, a clear consensus regarding the appropriate refugee
eligibility standard failed to appear among the courts that reviewed
withholding of deportation determinations. Some used the "wellfounded fear" standard. 25 Others used the "clear probability"
standard. 26 Still others employed an assortment of hybrid standards. 21
20. 114 CoNG. REc. 29,391 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mansfield); accord 114 CONG. REC.
27,757 (1968) (Message from the President transmitting the Protocol); 114 CONG. REc. 27,758
(Letter of submittal from the Department of State); 114 CONG. REc. 27,844 (1968) (statement
of Laurence A. Dawson of the Department of State).
21. S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968).
22. 1965 Amendments§ 11, 79 Stat. 911, 918 (1965) (amending 1952 Act§ 243(h), 66 Stat.
163, 214 (1952)) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)); see also supra note 5.
23. The Board explained in In re Dunar, 141. & N. Dec. 310, 322 (BIA 1973), that although
cases interpreting § 243(h) speak of the Attorney General's discretion, "we know of none in
which a finding has been made that the alien has established the clear probability that he will
be persecuted and in which § 243(h) withholding has nevertheless been denied in the exercise
of administrative discretion." But see In re Liao, 111. & N. Dec. 113, 117-19 (BIA 1965) (holding
it was not an abuse of discretion to deny withholding of deportation despite immigration judge's
reference to "considerable evidence" to support respondent's claim of likelihood of persecution
upon return to Formosa).
24. In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 72 (BIA 1968).
25. Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977); Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d l055,
l058 (2d Cir. 1976); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 1975).
26. Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977); Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d
1281, 1289 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 434 U.S. 962 (1977);
Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1976); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st
Cir. 1971).
27. Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1977) ("probable persecution"); Daniel v.
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On rare occasions, the courts addressed the issue squarely. In Kashani
v. INS, the Seventh Circuit opined that "the 'well founded fear' standard contained in the Protocol and the 'clear probability' standard
which this court has engrafted onto section 243(h) will in practice
converge. " 28 In Corio/an v. INS, however, the Fifth Circuit explained
that the Protocol standard, as viewed by the Board, "suggest[ed] at
least a slight diminution in the alien's burden of proof." 29 Thus, though
some attention was paid to the new Protocol standard, it was applied
unevenly and inconsistently.
2. Post-Protocol parole- The Attorney General's parole power was
also flexible enough to accommodate the ideologically neutral Protocol
standard. In practice, however, as the following table shows, ideology
continued to dominate decision making.
USE OF PAROLE POWER, 1968-8030
Non-Communist
Total Authorized
Latin America (excl. Cuba)
(1975-78)
4,400
Uganda (1972-73)
1,750
Lebanon (1978)
1,000
7,150
Communist
Cuba (1968-78)
232,666
USSR (1970-77)
17,200
USSR and Eastern Europe
(1978-79)
61,924
Czechoslavakia (1970)
6,500
Indochina (1975-79)
290,075
608,365
The admission of only 7,150 non-Communists indicates that although
the Attorney General ·could have admitted refugees regardless of
ideology, it remained the single most important concern.
The only efforts to implement the Protocol were regulatory in nature.
In 1972, the Department of State issued regulations permitting aliens
to seek sanctuary in the United -States and abroad. 31 The INS issued
INS, 528 F.2d 1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976); Khalil v. INS, 457 F.2d 1276, 1277 n.3 (9th Cir.
1972) ("would be persecuted"); Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 920 (1971); Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1970) ("likely" persecution);
Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969) ("probability of persecution").
28. 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977).
29. 559 F.2d 993, 997 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977).
30. Compiled from Schmidt, supra note 16; World Refugee Crisis, supra note 16.
31. 37 Fed. Reg. 3,447 (1979).
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regulations in 1974 establishing formal asylum procedures that
recognized the applicability of the Protocol. 32 In practice, however,
immigration authorities were still frustrating implementation of the Protocol and acting inconsistently with its generous underlying humanitarian
philosophy.

3.

Congressional concern about the failure to follow the Protocol-

After 1968, members of Congress increasingly sought to ensure compliance with the Protocol. 33 The need for reform was particularly
highlighted by the so-called "Kurdica Affair" in 1970, in which a
Lithuanian sailor who had jumped ship was returned to his vessel
without an opportunity to seek asylum. 34 Specifically, legislators introduced bills to require the INS to conform its standards and practices to those of the Protocol, applying a consistent steady pressure
for change froni 1973 until the passage of the 1980 Act. 35 Congressional debate centered on the refugee standard. 36 Indeed, it was the
subject of most of the hearings, and even representatives of the Departments of State and Justice recognized the difference between the
stringent "clear probability" standard and the Protocol standard. The
Justice Department, while supportive of the basic tenets of the refugee
provision, believed that "the 'well-founded fear of persecution' should
be limited to the 'well-founded fear of persecution in the opinion of
the Attorney General.' The Department believe[d] that . . . [otherwise] it would be entirely subjective with the alien claiming refugee

32. 39 Fed. Reg. 41,832 (1974).
33. See, e.g., S. 3202, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 36,965-71 (1969).
34. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 16 (Comm. Print 1980).
35. In 1973, Senator Kennedy introduced S. 2643, which was referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary, 119 CONG. REc. 35,734 (1973). The definition of the term "refugee" was patterned
closely on the Protocol definition. 119 CONG. REc. at 35,735, 35,737.
That same year, the House held extensive hearings on H.R. 981. See Western Hemisphere

Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 981 Before House Subcomm. No. I of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Witnesses noted with evident gratification the usage of the Protocol
terminology. Id. at 249-50, 258, 304, 306, 326; see also I 19 CONG. REc. 31,360 (1973) (statement
of Rep. Eilberg introducing the bill on the House floor); 119 CONG. REc. 31,454-55 (1973).
In 1975, in introducing S. 2405, Senator Kennedy said,
the act of 1965 was only the beginning of an important task . . . . It failed to resolve
a number of issues relating to immigration . . . . It was generally recognized at the
time that additional legislation would soon be needed. And this failure to act over
the past decade has ... been detrimental to fulfilling the intent of the I 965 Act ....
121 CONG. REc. 29,947 (1975). The bill proposed to excise the 1965 ideological biases and to
include the Protocol definition of refugee.
36. Most of the hearings concerned H.R. 367 and H.R. 981, both of which brought the
definition of refugee in line with the Protocol. See Western Hemisphere Immigration: Hearings

on H.R. 367, H.R. 981, and H.R. 10323, Before the House Subcom. on Immigration, Citizenship and lntemationa/ Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1976).
The eventual 1976 amendments, however, changed little. They were essentially a compromise
after sponsors of more comprehensive legislation failed to gain the required support.
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status whether his fear of being persecuted was well-founded [or not]." 37
The refugee standard was raised specifically as a topic in hearings
in 1977. Congresswoman Holtzman, ultimately the co-sponsor of the
1980 legislation, stated her concern with the narrow application of the
law:
[W]hen Congress creates a statutory scheme and does not really specify how that scheme is to be implemented it can be
thwarted by the executive branch. I am concerned because
although I think the definition [of refugee] in this bill is an
excellent one and even though it states what person will be a
refugee if he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution,
we don't specify how that well-founded fear is to be ascertained.
38

As a lawyer, Congresswoman Holtzman appreciated that a stringent
application can eviscerate the most generous legislation. 39
In 1978, Congressman Eilberg, expressing Congress's growing impatience with the failure to fulfill the spirit of the Protocol, stated
that "[f]or years we have received assurances ... from the Justice
Department . . . that criteria, guidelines, and regulations would be
promulgated . . . so we would not have to go through the necessity
of moving legislation. Yet this has never taken place.' ' 40 The stage was
set for comprehensive legislation.
II.

THE REFUGEE ACT OF

1980

The Refugee Act of 198041 established a standard for uniform and
nonideological refugee eligibility. Congress intended this new standard
to be compatible with the humanitarian traditions and international
obligations of the United States. Central to the Act was a statutory
definition of "refugee" which conformed to that of the Protocol. A
refugee was defined as
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
Id. at 18.
Policy and Procedures for the Admission of Refugees into the United States: Hearings
on H.R. 3056 Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1977) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
37.
38.

39. H.R. 3056 is specifically cited in the legislative history of the 1980 Act as the genesis
of that law. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
40. Hearings on the Admission of Refugees into the United States, II, Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 15 (1978) (statement of Rep. Eilberg).
41. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).

WINTER

1984)

Unfulfilled Asylum Promise

251

outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . . 4 ~
Conditional entry was eliminated 43 and the new refugee standard was
adopted to determine claims for asylum 44 and claims for withholding
of deportation. 45
There is no doubt that Congress intended the definition of "refugee"
in the 1980 Act to conform to that in the Protocol. 46 During hearings,
the derivation of the term was often mentioned and never questioned.
Indeed, this intent was emphasized in the report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and debate on the Senate floor. 47
Similarly, throughout House consideration of the bill, references were
made to ''the fundamental change under the legislation ... , the replacing
of the existing definition of refugee with the definition which appears
in the U .N. Convention and Protocol . . . . " 48 The definition was
changed to excise ideological bias from immigration law and to facilitate
bringing refugees into this country by requiring that only a well-founded

42. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)§ l01(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
43. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 202, 94 Stat. at 107.
44. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § l 158(a) (1982).
45. INA§ 243, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1983), asylum requests
are to be "considered as requests for withholding exclusion or deportation pursuant to Section
243(h) of the Act." See also In re Matelot, I. & N. Int. Dec. No. 2927 (Nov. 1, 1982); In re
Portales, I. & N. Int. Dec. No. 2905 (May 14, 1982); In re Castellon, 17 I. & N. Dec. 616
(BIA 1981).
The language of § 243(h) was amended to track in relevant part the language of Article 33
of the Convention. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107. Moreover,
in acceding to the Convention/Protocol in 1968, the Executive assured that Section 243(h) could
accommodate the non-refoulement obligation imposed by Article 33. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968). Article 33 in turn defines the term "refugee" as used in the Protocol.
This analysis is supported by the general purpose of the Refugee Act to utilize uniform standards
to allocate refuge in the United States. The different standards used in withholding, conditional
entry, and parole were to be unified. Refugee Act of 1980 - Conference Report, S. REP. No.
590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference).
46. See, e.g., 126 CoNG. REc. 3,757 (1980) (statement of Sen. Kennedy: "The new definition
makes our law conform to the United Nations Convention and Protocol . . . . ").
47. The Refugee Act of 1979 - Report, S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 125
CONG. REc. 23,231 (1979).
48. Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
27 (1979) (statement of Griffin 8. Bell, Attorney General of the United States) [hereinafter cited
as Refugee Act Hearings]; see also id. at 43, 168, 169, 248, 251, 280, 284, 291, 357, 361, 383,
393; 125 CONG. REc. 35,813-26 (1979). Before the 1980 Act, the term "refugee" had not been
defined by statute. The definition was derived from a composite of the procedures through which
refuge was available - withholding of deportation, conditional entry, and the parole power.
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fear of persecution be established. 49 Congress emphasized its concern
over the intransigence of immigration authorities in the past and expressed its intention to monitor compliance in the future: "The Committee intends to monitor closely the Attorney General's implementation of the [asylum] section so as to insure the rights of those it seeks
to protect.'' 50

A.

The Refugee Standard

Even though Congress emphasized the uniform, nonideological standard through the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, immigration
authorities continued to follow the "clear probability" standard. 51 For
example, in one case, the Board denied withholding despite documentary evidence confirming the applicant's defection from the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the nature and activities of the
PIRA, finding under the "clear probability" standard that the alien
had not demonstrated that the Irish government could not control the
PIRA. 52 The Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that the standard
applied had been virtually "impossible" to satisfy. 53
More recently, the Board has developed a hybrid formulation requiring that, in order to be eligible for refugee status, "an alien must
demonstrate a clear probability that he will be persecuted if returned
to his country or a well-founded fear of such persecution. " 54 There
is a suggestion now that the Board has conformed its practice to the
standard under the Protocol and Refugee Act." According to an internal management report prepared in 1982 by the INS, however, the
Service still adheres in practice to the "clear probability" standard. 56
49. See Refugee Act Hearings, supra note 48, at 169, 284 (testimony of A. Whitney Elsworth
and Hurst Hannum); Briefing on the Growing Refugee Problem; Implications for International

Organizations, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations of the Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1979) (statement of Dick Clark, U.S. Co-ordinator
of Refugee Affairs).
50. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong:, 1st Sess. 18 (1979).
51. See, e.g., In re McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542 (BIA 1980), rev'd, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th
Cir. 1981).
52. Id.
53. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Marroquin-Manriquez
v. INS, 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983) (withholding denied by the Board where the applicant had
been involved in a student political organization, a member of which had been killed, and the
alien had been linked to the killing; and where three expert witnesses testified in support of
the applicant's claim), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3091 (U.S. Apr. 7, 1983) (No. 82-1649).
54. In re Portales, I. & N. Int. Dec. No. 2905, at 4 (May 14, 1982) (citations omitted).
55. See Stevie v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983)
(No. 82-973). The Supreme Court granted certiorari at the government's request, presumably
to resolve a conflict between the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits on the refugee standard.
See Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982); Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
Stevie was orally argued before the Court on December 6, 1983.
56. IMMIGRATION AND NATIJRALIZATION SERVICE, AsYLUM ADJUDICATIONS: AN EVOLVING CON-
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Admittedly, the "clear probability" standard is extremely difficult to meet. "If we use that all the time," said a district
director, "no one would be given asylum." Another person
said, "The claimant said his father was murdered. He had a
newspaper article showing a picture of someone he said was
his father and two other men in Iran being lynched. But I don't
know if it's his father. He's also got an affidavit from a friend
who was present describing the executions. But the friend could
be lying." The claim was denied. 57
The current refugee standard is the subject of considerable discussion
within the Service. One lawyer quoted in the report stated:
[A] well-founded fear of persecution seems to me to be a standard that is easier to meet, and more in keeping with the actual
level of proof that a person could reasonably be expected to
present. I would translate this standard in colloquial terms as:
'If what the person says is true, would I fear going back there?'
Under the clear probability test, you would say, 'I absolutely
can't go back'. 58
In August 1983, the Service issued overseas refugee processing guidelines
which utilize the "well-founded fear" standard. ' 9

B.

The Continuing Role of Ideology

Ideology also continues to dominate asylum decision making,
translating into ready asylum grants for applicants who flee from
Communist-dominated regimes, and into far less generous grants to
those who flee regimes with which the United States has good relations, irrespective of their human rights records. Statistics provided
by the INS for fiscal year 1983 support this conclusion. For example,
seventy-eight percent of the Russian, sixty-four percent of the Ethiopian, fifty-three percent of the Afghan, and forty-four percent of the
Romanian cases decided received political asylum, all involving persons fleeing Communist-dominated regimes. On the other hand, asylum
was granted in less than eleven percent of the Philippine, twelve percent of the Pakistani, two percent of the Haitian, two percent of the
Guatemalan and three percent of the Salvadoran cases. 60
54 (June & December
1982) [hereinafter cited as INS ADJUDICATIONS]. A copy of the report is available from the author.
57. Id. at 54-55.
58. Id. at 55.
59. A copy of the guidelines is available from the author.
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A copy of the statistics is available from the author.
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El Salvador provides a good illustration. Our government has identified significant foreign policy interests with the government of El
Salvador. 61 As a matter of foreign policy, therefore, our Executive
branch (which includes the State Department and the INS) has every
incentive to characterize the situation in El Salvador as an improving
one - an image that would be jeopardized by granting asylum to
Salvadorans. An internal INS report confirms that ideology continues
to be part of the asylum calculus:
In some cases, different levels of proof are required of different
asylum applicants. In other words, certain nationalities appear
to benefit from presumptive status, while others do not. For
example, for an El Salvadoran national to receive a favorable
advisory opinion, he or she must have a "classic textbook case."
On the other hand ·[the State Department] sometimes recommends favorable action where the applicant cannot meet the
individual well-founded fear of persecution test. This happened
in December 1981 a week after martial law was declared in
Poland. Seven Polish crewmen jumped ship and applied for
asylum in Alaska. Even before seeing the asylum applications,
a State Department official said "We're going to approve them."
All the applications, in the view of INS senior officials, were
extremely weak. In one instance, the crewman said the reason
he feared returning to Poland was that he had once attended
a Solidarity rally (he was one of the more than 100,000 participants at the rally). The crewman had never been a member
of Solidarity, never participated in any political activity, etc.
His claim was approved within 48 hours. 62
C.

Domestic Policy Considerations

Domestic policy considerations have encroached upon the asylum
area as well. The United States has sought to deter asylum applicants
by intercepting them on the high seas and returning them to their home
countries before they reach our shores, by imprisoning them once they
arrive, and sometimes by depriving them of a fair opportunity to present their claims.
1. Interdiction- By presidential proclamation in September 1981, 63
the United States initiated an interdiction program which permits Coast
61. Until 1983, our Administration actually had to certify to Congress periodically that El
Salvador had shown progress in the area of human rights. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, 95 Stat. 1519 (1981).
62. INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 56, at 59 n. •.
63. Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981); Exec. Order 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg.
48,109 (1981).
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Guard vessels to intercept and board United States registered vessels,
as well as certain foreign vessels, and to make inquiries to determine
if passengers are undocumented aliens bound for the United States.
If so, they then can be returned to the country from which they came,
provided they are not political refugees. They do not have access to
counsel to assist in their identification as refugees. 64
The only country with which an agreement has been made in the
interdiction program is Haiti. Approximately 500 Haitians have been
intercepted under the interdiction program. Not one has been found
entitled to seek refugee status in the United States, and all have been
returned to Haiti. 65
Interdiction represents a radical departure from normal inspection
and inquiry procedures which afford an alien the opportunity to present his or her case, through counsel, to an immigration judge. 66 As
to refugees, interdiction runs afoul of the obligations under the domestic
withholding provision and its international law correlative - Article
33 of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees - to refrain from
refoulement. 67 This is the duty not to expel or return a refugee to the
frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.
A refugee who would otherwise undergo persecution might be
returned upon interdiction without any recourse simply because of an
inability to articulate the reasons feared, or to persuade an on-ship
inspector that the fear is well-founded, or simply because he or she
is afraid to speak to authorities. This is particularly so since there would
be no access to counsel under these circumstances.
A refugee fleeing persecution after a stressful and surreptitious journey
often lacks the documentary resources, the psychological reserve, an~
even perhaps the willingness to persuade someone of the integrity of
his or her asylum claim. Indeed, the Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 68 used by the United States in the analysis
of asylum claims, 69 emphasizes the difficulties experienced by aliens
64. See Proclamation No. 4865, supra note 63; Exec. Order 12,324, supra note 63.
65. See diplomatic letters dated September 23, 1981, exchanged between the governments
of the United States and Haiti. Copies of the letters are available in the author's files. See also
Miami Herald, June 15, 1983, at I, col. I.
66. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226-1227, 1362 (1982).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982); Protocol, supra note 17, at art. I, § I; Convention, supra
note 17, at art. 33.
68. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
69. See Stevie v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983)
(No. 82-973); In re Frentescu, I. & N. Int. Dec. No. 2906 (June 23, 1982); In re RodriguezPalma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465 (BIA 1980).
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in pursuing asylum at a national border: '' [The applicant for refugee
status] finds himself in an alien environment and may experience serious
difficulties, technical and psychological, in submitting his case to the
authorities of a foreign country, often in a language not his own." 70
The Handbook recommends taking special care in processing such
applications. 11
2. Detention- In the summer of 1981, the United States embarked
upon a new alien detention policy. Prior to 1981, traditional administrative practice regarding the detention of aliens seeking admission to the United States, at least since Ellis Island closed in 1954,
had been to release them absent a demonstrable security risk or
likelihood of absconding. 12 This practice applied to aliens with or
without a passport or visa, as well as to applicants for political asylum
in the United States. The Supreme Court in 1958 explained:
The parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through
which needless confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are conducted . . . . Physical detention of aliens is now
the exception, not the rule, and is generally employed only as
to security risks or those likely to abscond . . . . Certainly this
policy reflects the humane qualities of an enlightened civilization. 73
The liberal release practice changed dramatically in the summer of
1981. In particular, Haitians who arrived in FJorida during that summer were immediately confined without consideration of whether they
were security risks or likely to abscond. 74 This change in. policy corresponded to an announcement by the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service that ''in the future, undocumented aliens
arriving in the United States who do not choose to depart voluntarily
70. HANDBOOK, supra note 68, at , 190. The Handbook explains why applicants may be
hesitant to express their claims, even before the proper authorities. "A person, who because
of his experiences, was in fear of the authorities in his own country may still feel apprehensive
vis-a-vis any authority. He may therefore be afraid to speak freely and give a full and accurate
account of his case." Id. at , 198.
71. Id. at , 190.
72. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (citation omitted).
13. Id. See Rodriquez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). In RodriquezFernandez, the Tenth Circuit explained that "[d]etention pending deportation seems properly
analogized to incarceration pending trial or other disposition of a criminal charge, and is, thus,
justifiable only as a necessary, temporary measure." 654 F.2d at 1387 (emphasis added). The
court did not find evidence that, previous to this case, a significant number of excludable aliens
had been detained for long periods of time. See also Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 980
n.18 (S.D. Fla. 1982), modified sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 7ll F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed
in part, rev'd in part, No. 82-5772, slip op. (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane).
74. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982), modified sub nom. Jean v. Nelson,
711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in part, rev'd in part, No. 82-5772, slip op. (11th
Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane).
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will be placed in administrative detention pending the determination
of their admissibility." 75
Legal challenges, including claims that the program was
discriminatory, were brought against the Haitian detention program
in 1981. In New York, fifty-three Haitians alleged discrimination in
their detention, initially in Miami and then after transfer to the Brooklyn
detention facility. 76 The case went to trial in late January 1982, and,
at that time, the Service began detaining undocumented aliens of other
nationalities, including Afghans, upon arrival in New York. 11
Another legal challenge to the Haitian detention program was brought
in Miami. On June 18, 1982, Judge Eugene P. Spellman ruled that the
new detention policy implemented with respect to Haitians had violated
the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act. He ordered the release of approximately 1,900 detained Haitians
on June 29, 1982. 78
On July 9, 1982, in response to Judge Spellman's decision, the Service published new alien detention regulations in the Federal Register
as an "interim rule," effective immediately. 79 The new regulations provided for the detention of arriving aliens without valid travel documentation (passport and/or visa). Release was limited to persons of advanced or tender age, those with medical conditions, or beneficiaries
of an approved relative petition. 80
In the period permitted, fifteen comments were filed with the Service, including one from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The comments stated that the interim rule
violated the Refugee Act of 1980, the Administrative Procedure Act,
and the United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
On October 19, 1982, however, the Service amended only the definition of "undocumented" aliens for the purpose of detention, and issued
a final rule. 81
75. Statement of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service 9 (July 31,
1981). A copy of the announcement is available from the author.
76. Vigile v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom. Bertrand v. Sava, 684
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982).
77. Ishtyaq v. Nelson, CV. 82-2288 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 4, 1982).
78. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982), modified sub nom. Jean v. Nelson,
711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983). On appeal, the district court's procedural determination was
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit. A panel of the Court of Appeals, however, went further, ruling
that the Haitian detention program had been a product of intentional governmental discrimination. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (I Ith Cir. 1983). On August 16, 1983, at the government's
request, the Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en bane and on February 28, 1984, it issued
a decision dismissing in part, reversing in part, and remanding the case with instructions, on
the grounds, inter alia, that excludable aliens do not have "constitutional rights with respect
to their applications for admission, asylum or parole." Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772, slip op.,
at 54 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 1984).
79. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044-46 (1982).
80. Id. at 30,045.
81. 47 Fed. Reg. 46,493-94 (1982). Prior to issuing the new regulations, the INS issued new
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The detention rule has swept many asylum seekers into its net, including, for example, several Afghans who are seeking political asylum
in the United States and who are being detained by the Service at a
facility in New York City. Some of those Afghans have now been imprisoned for well over one year, and litigation is pending regarding the validity of their continued detention under the new rule. 82
International experience has demonstrated that asylum seekers frequently flee persecution in their home countries without valid travel
documentation. Indeed, it would make little sense for a person fleeing
persecution to seek a passport or exit visa from the persecuting government. The Handbook of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees explains that:
[A]n applicant may not be able to support his statements by
documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant
can provide evidence of all his statements will be the exception
rather than the rule. In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without personal documents. 83
A detention program that focuses upon undocumented aliens falls
heavily upon asylum seekers, raising a number of troubling legal
questions.
Under a detention program, many arriving asylum applicants will
be imprisoned pending the adjudication of their claims. Aliens are entitled, however, to apply for political asylum in the United States ''irrespective" of their immigration status, i.e., whether or not they have
travel documents. 84 Also, Article 31 of the Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, to which the United States became a party in 1968, 85
prol_iibits the imposition of penalties "on account of their illegal entry
or presence," as well as unnecessary "restrictions" on their movement. 86
A detention measure which burdens some asylum seekers with imprisonment and which penalizes them for petitioning for asylum would violate
detention policy guidelines in exclusion cases in early January 1982. Under the new guidelines,
detention is the rule with release the exception for persons who have "a serious medical condition," who are pregnant, who are minors, or who have had relative petitions filed on their behalf
and approved by the INS. These guidelines were revised in April 1982 regarding the release of
juveniles. 59 Interpreter Releases 344, 349-50 (1982). They were revised again on June 27, 1983,
to permit INS district directors to consider the release of any person who had final orders of
deportation and whose departure could not likely be enforced. 60 Interpreter Releases 536-37 (1983).
82. Ishtaq v. Nelson, CV. 82-2288 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 4, 1982). The regulations survived
a motion for summary judgment in a decision on October 4, 1983.
83. HANDBOOK, supra note 68, at ~ 196.
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
85. See supra note 17.
86. Protocol, supra note 17, at art. I, § I; Convention, supra note 17, at art. 31.
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the right to pursue asylum under the Refugee Act of 1980 and the
Constitution. 87 Such detention, furthermore, would constitute a penalty
and an unnecessary restriction under the Protocol.
A detention program would mean prolonged imprisonment for many
arriving asylum applicants. Although indefinite imprisonment of aliens
by itself may be legally infirm, 88 it has particularly adverse consequences
for asylum seekers. Imprisonment during the asylum adjudication process makes representation by counsel difficult, and prolonged imprisonment may force refugees to return to countries where they will be
persecuted. 89 Such is the experience of the Haitians who have "chosen"
to return to Haiti. After being imprisoned under onerous conditions,
frequently in facilities designed for short-term detention, some Haitians have given up their right to apply for political asylum. One Haitian who returned "voluntarily" in June 1982 told a federal judge:
After 11 months in detention in the United States, I wish to
return to Haiti. My decision is based on the fact that, over
the past month, I have become very depressed and ill and have
not bee:Q able to receive medical treatment. I wish to state that
this decision to leave in no way indicates a change from my
previous position of fearing political persecution upon return.
I fully expect that I may be mistreated or even killed upon my
return to Haiti. However, I would rather die in my own country than remain in prison in the United States without any indication that I will ever be released. 90
A detention program that deters refugees from exercising their right
to apply for asylum would be inconsistent with legal obligations not
to return them to territories where they would be likely to suffer
persecution. 91
87. See Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 877 n.25 (2d Cir. 1983); Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1037-39 (5th Cir. 1982); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F.
Supp. 351, 374 -76 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 584-87 (S.D. Tex.),
dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982), cf Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772, slip op. (I Ith Cir.
Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane).
88. Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981); see Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
89. A 1,000 bed long-term alien detention facility is under construction at Oakdale, Louisiana. 60 Interpreter Releases 156 (1983). Oakdale is located in rural southwest Louisiana, and
lawyers in this relatively remote area are scarce. Unrepresented asylum seekers will likely simply
languish in detention.
90. Detention of Aliens in Bureau of Prison Facilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-69 (statement of Arthur C. Helton). The affidavit is available from
the author.
91. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982); Protocol, supra note 17, at art. I,§ I; Convention, supra
note 17, at art. 33.

260

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 17:2

3. Implementation problems- The manner in which the law has
been administered has also deterred arriving aliens from applying for
asylum. Often asylum seekers are denied a fair opportunity to present
their claims, and fair consideration of those claims once presented.
In the context of Haitian and Salvadoran cases, federal courts have
found numerous instances in which employees of the INS have sought
to coerce or mislead aliens into not applying for asylum or into
abandoning their claims once filed. 92
The prevalence of domestic immigration policy considerations in the
asylum process is recognized in the internal INS report, which explains
that:
By law, refugees and asylees must both meet the same
statutory definition. However, in both instances the standard
appears to be less strict for refugees overseas than it is for asylum
applicants in the United States . . . .
This double standard often results in anomalies between
nationality groups and even among members of the same nationality depending upon physical location. For example, at the
beginning of [fiscal year] 1982 INS accepted 99% of the Ethiopians presented overseas for admission to the United States as
refugees while rejecting more than 45% of the Ethiopian claims
for political asylum in the United States. Similarly, before the
imposition of martial law, acceptance rates for Polish refugees
overseas was about 75-80% while denial rates for Polish asylum
claimants topped 50% in some months. 93

Differentiating between asylees and refugees in this fashion contravenes
the neutral principles for decision making established by the Refugee
Act. In the view of an immigration judge quoted in the report, "[a]sylum
is a political, not a legal animal. As a sovereign nation, we exercise
the right to decide who enter~ and can stay on our shores. We have
created our own problems by not applying strict enough standards and
by bowing to pressure from special interest groups. " 94 No statement
could be more at odds with the mandate of the Refugee Act.
The United States is not immune from the worldwide phenomenon
of large numbers of displaced persons and refugees moving across
borders, and, shortly upon its enactment, the 1980 Act was sorely tested
92. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin, 537
F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982); see Haitian Refugee Center
v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
93. INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 56, at 80; see also Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980:
Its Past and Future, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
REFUGEES 9, 112 (1982).
94. INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 56, at 55.
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in this regard. Statistics provided by the INS 95 indicate that in fiscal
year 1980, 15,955 aliens arrived in the United States and applied for
political asylum. The numbers, moreover, continued to mount. In 1981,
63,202 aliens applied for asylum, and in 1982, 37,027 applied. In 1983,
however, only 8,423 asylum cases were filed. 96 Despite the decrease,
165,998 asylum cases were reported as pending in the United States
at the end of 1983. 97
The INS has chosen to simply not decide many pending cases. Asylum
cases have a relatively low priority in the Service. The information provided by the INS shows that 598 applications were completed in 1980,
4,521 applications were completed in 1981, and 12,064 applications
were completed in 1982. Only 9,798 cases were completed in 1983. 98
On the other hand, in 1981, the Service received 1,880,000 petitions
and applications for various immigration benefits, and processed
1,770,000 of those matters. 99
Additionally, the INS has held only two in-service programs for some
of its asylum officers, and only one program has been held for immigration judges. 100 The lack of instruction on asylum standards,
furthermore, has had an especially pernicious effect. As indicated
previously, the right of asylum in the United States historically has
been clouded by foreign relations considerations. The Refugee Act of
Copies of the statistics are available from the author.
Another way that the right of asylum has been limited recently is through the development
in 1982 of the concept that asylum may be denied as a matter of "discretion." See In re Salim,
I. & N. Int. Dec. No. 2922 (Sept..29, 1982), in which the Board denied asylum (but granted
withholding of deportation) to an Afghan refugee on the ground that he had circumvented the
overseas refugee admission process in coming to the United States, and it has not yet been the
subject of judicial challenge. The precise scope of the doctrine has yet to be worked out. A
broad interpretation would state an exception that would swallow whole the right of asylum.
96. Copies of the statistics are available from the author. In May 1983, the INS began to
keep statistics based on the number of asylum cases filed instead of the number of aliens applying
for asylum, thereby eliminating from the count derivative applications concerning the family
members of principal applicants. There are no statistics for asylum applications in the immigration court in fiscal year 1983. The reduction in applications in 1983, however, is likely not attributable
in any significant degree to the lack of immigration court statistics for that period. There are
only 55 immigration judges in the United States. In a three-month period in 1982, the only period
for which statistics are available, only 468 cases were resolved in the immigration court.
97. Copies of the statistics are available from the author. This statistic, however, is somewhat
overstated. The information provided by the Service indicates that of the 165,998 pending cases,
over two-thirds concerned nationals of countries which had been given special temporary immigration status, including 115,162 Cubans and 1,843 Poles. See 60 Interpreter Releases 2, 484,
971, 972 (1983); 59 Interpreter Releases 85, 260, 445, 659-60 (1982); 57 Interpreter Releases 305-06,
498-99 (1980).
98. See supra note 96.
99. 1981 Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 160. This is the most recent year for which such statistics
are available.
100. INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 56, at 32-34, 73-76. A second program for selected
asylum officers was held in December 1983. A program was held for immigration judges at
a week-long conference in November 1983 in Miami. A copy of the program agenda is available
from the author.
95.
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1980 sought to introduce ideologically neutral standards to determine
refugee status. Absent training and the development of any independent
expertise, however, asylum officers and immigration judges are forced
to rely almost exclusively upon the required "advisory" opinions of
the Department of State regarding whether or not the applicant has
a well-founded fear of persecution. 101 Such opinions are conclusory
and unenlightening in that the information upon which they are based
is ordinarily disclosed neither to the asylum seeker nor the immigration adjudicator. It is not surprising, therefore, that State Department
opinions are followed virtually invariably by the INS. 102 In the words
of one INS adjudicator: "I would never, never overrule the State
Department." 103 Consequently, the ideological allocation of asylum,
once expressly recognized by statute, continues in practice under the
1980 Refugee Act.
Ill.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The new alien interdiction and detention programs violate the rights
of refugees. The focus of reform should not be on deterrence, which
may result in the return of refugees to territories where they face persecution. Rather, the focus should be on establishing a fair and expeditious
asylum adjudication system.

A.

Recruitment and Training

Traditionally, immigration judges have come from the ranks of the
INS. Judges inculcated with the law enforcement ethos of the INS
sometimes lack sensitivity to the rights of aliens. Immigration judges,
therefore, should be recruited from outside as well as from inside the INS.
Also, immigration judges and other immigration adjudicators should
be instructed in the law and history of human rights and refugees. 104
In addition to initial instruction, adjudicators should be exposed to
different perspectives through creative in-service training programs. This
ongoing training should involve groups such as the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the international
organization charged with supervising the compliance of state parties
with the Protocol, 105 as well as advocates of the rights of asylum seekers.
IOI. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 208. 7, 208. I0(b) (1983).
102. INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 56, at 62, 63.
103. Id. at 62.
104. See S. 529, introduced into the Senate, 129 CONG. REC. S1342-46 (daily ed. Feb. 17,
I 983); H.R. 1510, introduced into the House, 129 CONG. REc. H570-72 (daily ed. Feb. 17, I 983).
Under both bills, administrative law judges would be given special training in international relations and law.
105. See G.A. Res. 428 (v), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
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Department of State Involvement

The State Department should not provide opinions on the ultimate
question to be decided in individual cases - whether the alien has
a well-founded fear of persecution. Such conclusory pronouncements
simply serve to continue the practice of ideological allocation of asylum
which the Refugee Act of 1980 was designed to change. Should the
State Department wish to make information on conditions in individual
countries available to the immigration adjudicator, then that information should be revealed to the INS, as well as to the alien and his
or her counsel. Only through such disclosure can proper weight be given
to the position of the State Department.
C.

The Involvement of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees

One desirable procedural safeguard in the review of agency asylum
determinations is formal involvement in the process by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Such a role would depoliticize
the process and encourage independent review of asylum determinations.
The role of the UNHCR in the determination of refugee status varies
from country to country. In Belgium, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
has delegated the determination of refugee status to the UNHCR, 106
while in Italy, Somalia, and Tunisia, the UNHCR is one of the decision makers in the process. 101 In seven other countries, the UNHCR
is represented on an advisory commission that interviews applicants
and makes recommendations to the final decision maker. 108 In Spain,
the UNHCR is consulted before a decision on refugee status is made,
and in Austria the UNHCR may express its views prior to a decision.1° 9
Other countries facilitate UNHCR oversight of the refugee determination process by various methods. For example, the UNHCR is
informed of all applications for refugee status in Austria, Greece, and
106. Note on Procedures for the Determination of Refugee Status Under International Instruments, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/INF.152/Rev.3, at 1 20 (1981). Before the application reaches
UNHCR, the Aliens Office of the Ministry of Justice determines whether the application has
been submitted within legal time limits and whether Belgium is a proper asylum country. Id. at 121.
107. In Italy, the UNHCR is one of three members on a Joint Eligibility Commission which
determines refugee status. Id. at 1 75. The UNHCR is an ex officio member of the Committee
for Refugee Acceptance in Somalia. Id. at 1 122. Applicants for refugee status in Tunisia normally apply first to UNHCR for a refugee certificate, and then are recognized as refugees by
the Tunisian authorities. Id. at 11 145-146.
108. The UNHCR has an advisory role on the commission in Australia, Djibouti, and Portugal. Id. at 11 12, 52, I 12. In New Zealand and Senegal, the UNHCR representative may submit his or her views to the commission. Id. at 11 102, 117. He or she is an active participant
in the meetings of the Canadian advisory committee. Id. at 137. In Zambia, the UNHCR representative may question applicants and record dissenting opinions. Id. at 1 177.
· 109. Id. at 11 17, 127.
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New Zealand, 110 while in West Germany, a UNHCR representative may
attend applicant interviews with the federal official who decides on
applications. 111 A role for UNHCR in the United States would serve
to rationalize a now overly politicized asylum process.

Conclusion
Despite the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, the integrity of
the right to asylum in the United States is threatened. The Act continues to be subverted through legally questionable practices of interdiction, detention, and unfairness in the adjudication process. The right
to asylum itself is under attack. We hear often of a "crisis" in asylum
in America. That crisis, however, lies not in the increasing numbers
of asylum seekers,. but in whether the right of asylum can withstand
the expedient policy solutions which until now governed the process.
Full and fair implementation of the Refugee Act requires the depoliticization of the asylum process, the recognition of the uniform
Protocol standard, and above all, the acknowledgem_ent of the minimal
individual rights and dignity of asylum seekers. Only then will the promise of the Refugee Act be fulfilled.

llO. Id. at,, 7, 12, 17, 72, 102. The UNHCR may contact and assist applicants in Algeria,
Australia, Greece, Morocco, and New Zealand. Id. at ,, 7, 17, 72, 92, 102.
Ill. Id. at , 67.

